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Abstract
Considering self−protection, it is a well−known result that an increase in risk aversion does
not unambiguously lead to a higher level of effort. In this paper, we consider a particular case
of self−protection, the choice of a lawyer, assuming a positive relation between legal
expenses and probability of success. In this context, level of effort is strictly monotone in risk
aversion. We show that, paradoxically, the level of effort is not systematically higher for an
indemnified more risk−averse agent than for a non−indemnified less risk−averse agent.
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The notion of self-protection was ¯rst described in Ehrlich and Becker (1972) as an
alternative to the more intuitive concept of self-insurance. Considering two possible
outcomes for a risky situation, self-protection can be de¯ned as the possibility to increase
the probability of success at a given cost. This concept is adapted not only for insurance
problems, as is often studied in the literature, but also in the R&D ¯eld or in the
juridical framework, as noted by Ehrlich and Becker themselves 1. We study this case
in this paper.
It is extremely important for a legal claimant or defendant to choose his lawyer very
carefully. Indeed, the probability of success depends on this choice. In this paper we
consider this activity as a pure self-protection activity. As self-protection, choosing a
lawyer allows a reduction in the probability of incurring a loss (to lose the trial). Thus,
we suppose that the lawyer's cost is proportional to his \expertise" (experience acquired
in similar cases, reputation, etc) and that his \expertise" induces an objective reduction
in the probability of failure.
But choosing a lawyer is a very special case of self-protection since the lawyer's cost is
usually repaid in case of victory2. In this situation, we show that the probability distri-
bution is modi¯ed in a di®erent manner than in the standard self-protection problem.
The distribution shifts to the left only for the low outcomes and not for the high one.
This property changes the classical result ¯rst provided by Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985)
that a more risk-averse individual would not necessarily invest more in self-protection
activities. In our case, the more the agent is risk-averse, the more he invests in the
choice of his lawyer. Nevertheless, another counterintuitive result appears if we consider
a more risk-averse individual, who will be reimbursed in case of a victory, with a less-risk
averse individual, who will not be reimbursed.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an overview of the self-protection
standard problem and the principal results. Section 3 introduces the speci¯cities of our
model with repayment and shows how the results are modi¯ed. Section 4 concludes.
1`[...] good lawyers reduce both the probability of conviction and the punishment for crime.'[p 634]
Actually authors use this example to illustrate the case of self-protection and self-insurance at the same
time. The latter, denoted self-insurance-cum-protection, has been examined in detail by Lee (1998).
2For instance, in France, this procedure is examined in Art. 475-1 du Code de Proc¶ edure P¶ enale
(CPP) et art. 700 du Nouveau Code de Proc¶ edure Civile (NCPC).
12 The standard self-protection problem
2.1 Notations
Consider an individual who has initial wealth W. This wealth is subject to a possible loss
L. The individual invests e (the e®ort) in self-protection3 that a®ects the probability
of the loss p(e) 2 [0;1], decreasing and convex. This type of activities alters the risk
distribution itself as opposed to insurance (or self-insurance), which simply alters the
¯nancing of risk's consequences. In this model, ¯nal wealth depends on whether or not
the loss occurs. Final wealth is B if the loss occurs and A if not:
A ´ W ¡ c(e) ; B ´ W ¡ L ¡ c(e)
where c(e), increasing and convex, denotes the cost of an e®ort e, and A > B because
of the positive loss. The individual's problem is to choose e to maximize his expected
utility:
Eu = p(e)u(B) + [1 ¡ p(e)]u(A) (1)
where u is a classical VNM utility function. When an interior maximum exists, an
optimal e for an individual with an utility function u, denoted es 2 [0;+1[, satis¯es the
following ¯rst-order condition @Eu





0(B) + (1 ¡ p)u
0(A)] ¡ p
0[u(A) ¡ u(B)] (2)
It is assumed that the second-order condition is satis¯ed5. Actually, the sign of the
second-order condition depends on features of u and p(e). We hereafter consider that
these features are met here. Then the problem becomes concave in e. The unique
solution to (2) is denoted es.
2.2 E®ect of an increase in risk aversion in the standard case
Let us now consider a more risk-averse individual in the Arrow-Pratt sense with a VNM
function denoted v . This is equivalent to the existence of a concave function g such






0(B) + (1 ¡ p)g
0[u(A)]u
0(A)] ¡ p
0[g[u(A)] ¡ g[u(B)]] = 0 (3)
3As mentioned by Sweeney and Beard (1992), `self-protection is also referred as \care" in the legal
liability literature, and as \loss prevention" in the insurance context'(p 301).
4For greater convenience, c0 refers to c0(e) and p0 refers to p0(e).
5In the risky choice literature, it is well-known that the second order condition is not naturally
satis¯ed for the preventive choices. For greater precision, see Eeckhoudt et al. (2005), chap 9, 141-9.
2Evaluated at e = es, the sign of (3) cannot be determined unambiguously, as shown by
Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) in particular cases. Thus a more risk-averse individual
does not always purchase more self-protection6. This result is standard in the risk theory
and states the ¯rst theorem:
Theorem 1 A more risk-averse individual may exert a higher or a lower e®ort in a
self-protection activity compared to a less risk-averse individual.
A didactic demonstration is given in Briys and Schlesinger (1990) with an intuitive
exposition in terms of mean-preserving spread and contraction7. Let us now consider
the particular case of self-protection where the cost of e®ort provided by the individual
(for self-protection) is repaid in case of success.
3 Self-protection with repayment of the e®ort in
case of success
As mentioned in the introduction, some legal law procedures make provisions for re-
payment of expenditures to the winner (we do not consider here who must pay this
amount8). Another di®erence with the standard case is that the individual is not nec-
essarily in a risky situation. Sometimes it can be chosen not to initiate the legal action.
In this case the individual prefers a certain loss to an implicit lottery corresponding to
the civil proceedings. If the action is initiated, we have: A ´ W and expected utility is
similar to (2):
Eu = p(e)u(B) + [1 ¡ p(e)]u(W) (4)






0[u(W) ¡ u(B)] = 0 (5)
The ¯rst issue is to know whether or not the individual will initiate the legal action.
In a general framework, it depends on the characteristics of functions c(e), p(e) and u,
because we must have: Eu ¸ u(W ¡ L) which is equivalent to:
p(e) ·
u(W) ¡ u(W ¡ L)
u(W) ¡ u(W ¡ L ¡ c(e))
6Assuming `single crossing', we can get a monotone relation between risk aversion and level of self-
protection (see Jewitt (1989) or Athey (2001,2002)).
7Others similar developments can be found in McGuire et al. (1991).
8In some cases, the loser must pay. We would then have to consider strategic interactions between
opponents, which are studied in the contest or rent-seeking literature. See Konrad and Schlesinger
(1997) or Skaperdas and Gan (1995) for speci¯c papers combining contests and risk preferences and
Nitzan (1994) for a more general contribution.
3The following condition ensures that legal action will be initiated9:
Condition 1: lim(¡1) u0 is a ¯nite number, (ii) lim(0) p0 = +1, (iii) lim(0) c0 = 0 and
(iv) p(0)=1.
Assuming Condition 1 is veri¯ed, there must exist e such that p(e) · Á(e), with Á(e)
the right-hand side of the above inequality. Appropriated functions are represented in










Assuming these restrictions, the marginal e®ect of a very little e®ort is so high compared
to the marginal cost of this e®ort that the individual always has an interest to exert it
and then to initiate the legal action. Note that these restrictions are not counterintuitive
and allow a consideration of only the risky case, which is obviously a useful simpli¯cation.
3.1 Comparison with the standard case
Is repayment a good incentive to invest more in self-protection? In a similar way to
the analysis made by Briys and Schlesinger (1990), to look at the di®erence between
standard self-protection and self-protection with repayment from the viewpoint of out-
comes, assume the probabilities of endowed outcomes are given by A and B. Standard
self-protection (¯gure 3) by shifting the whole distribution to the left to, say, A' and
B', lowers the probability of low outcomes and raises the probability of high ones. Self-
protection with repayment (¯gure 4), on the other hand, by shifting the distribution
to the left only for the low outcomes to, say, A and B', lowers the probability of low
outcomes and raises the probability of high ones without change the high outcomes.
We show that self-protection with repayment leads to a higher level of e®ort.
Proposition 1 A risk-averse individual will unambiguously purchase more self-protection
if the cost of self-protection is repaid in case of success.
9Condition 1 is a weaker version of condition C1 in Jullien et al. (1998, p 23). Concavity of the
program is satis¯ed given concavity of u and Condition 1. We implicitly assume c(0) = 0. In other
words, the cost of a zero-e®ort is a zero-cost (no ¯xed cost).
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Figure 4
Self-protection with repayment if success
Proof 1 We evaluate @Eu=@e (equation (5)) at e = es (equation 2)). This yields:
@Ev
@e je=es = ¡p0[u(W) ¡ u(A)] + c0[(1 ¡ p)u0(A)] which is positive.¤
Reimbursement being a su±cient incentive to invest more in self-protection, a ¯rst con-
clusion is that reimbursement is also a su±cient condition for a higher total amount of
legal expenditures.
3.2 E®ect of an increase in risk aversion
A well-known counterintuitive result concerning self-protection is that the e®ort is not
a monotone function of the level of risk aversion. How is this result in our framework
modi¯ed? As in the standard case, we derive the ¯rst-order-condition corresponding to a








0[g[u(W)] ¡ g[u(B)]] (6)
Proposition 2 With repayment, e®ort unambiguously declines when risk-aversion in-
creases.
Proof 2 In a manner similar to [3], we assume g[u(W)] = u(W) and g[u(B)] = u(B).
This is possible without any particular restriction on u. An increase in risk aversion
means g0[u(B)] > 1. Whereas the second term in right-hand side is maintained constant
between (5) and (6), the ¯rst term is increasing. Then @Ev
@e je=e¤ < 0.¤
If this result appears counterintuitive at the ¯rst sight, this might be due to a misinter-
pretation of the risk aversion notion. If we do not consider a more pronounced aversion
for loss10 or prudence11, risk aversion per se does not lead to a higher level of invest-
ment in self-protection. Actually, as the self-protection damages the low outcome, we
10See Menezes et al. (1980).
11See Kimball(1990) for the concept of prudence and Chiu (2000) or Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005)
for the impact of prudence on optimal prevention.
5may suppose that a more risk-averse individual will choose to minimize this e®ort of
self-protection from fear of undergoing a heavier loss in case of trial failure.
3.3 Joint-e®ect of repayment and increase in risk aversion
The two ¯rst propositions state that repayment leads to a higher e®ort, whereas an
increase in risk aversion entails a lower e®ort. In other terms, a given individual invests
more in self-protection if he is likely to be repaid (reimbursement e®ect) and if we
compare two individuals with di®erent preferences, the more risk-averse will invest less
in self-protection (risk aversion e®ect). Both these con°icting e®ects are present if we
consider the case of a non-repaid less risk-averse individual compared to a repaid more
risk-averse one. The question is then: is it possible to assess the behaviour of a more
risk-averse individual with a possibility of reimbursement, compared to a less risk-averse
individual without reimbursement? The result is as follows:
Proposition 3 A more risk-averse individual, who may bene¯t from an indemnity, will
not unambiguously exert a higher e®ort than a less risk-averse individual with no in-
demnity.
Proof 3 We thus evaluate @Ev
@e at e = es. It is equivalent to insert @Eus
@e in the FOC
(equation 6), which yields: @Ev
@e = c0[p[1 ¡ g0(u(B))u0(B)] + c0(1 ¡ p)u0(A) + p0[u(A) ¡
g(u(W))¡u(B)+g(u(B))]. The expression cannot be signed without ambiguity. To show
this we can here assume without loss of generality that g[u(A)] = u(A) and g[u(B)] =
u(B). Because g is increasing, g(u(W)) > u(A) and the third right-hand side term is
positive. Inversely the second term is negative because p < 1 and assuming g0(u(B)) > 1
(see [3]), we have the ¯rst term negative without ambiguity. ¤
The proposition states that neither the reimbursement e®ect, nor the risk aversion ef-
fect systematically prevails. In other words, for any given cost of e®ort, which may be
repaid, there always exists a su±cient increase in risk aversion leading to a lower e®ort.
The intuition of this result follows Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005, p 990). Suppose the
probability of loss is initially high. In such a situation, a higher e®ort (meaning a lower
probability of loss) induces a higher level of risk (higher variance in the distribution),
which may not be pro¯table for risk-averse individuals despite reimbursement. In addi-
tion, the higher the probability, the lower the reimbursement. Assuming that the initial
probability is low leads to the opposite e®ect. Thus, an increase in risk aversion has an
ambiguous e®ect on the optimal level of e®ort.
64 Conclusion
Examining a particular case of self-protection through the choice of a lawyer, we observe
that the counterintuitive result about self-protection and risk aversion does not hold
with repayment in case of success. Nevertheless, an ambiguous result appears if we
mix the possibility of reimbursement with an increase in risk aversion. This result is
perhaps even more counterintuitive than the standard self-protection result. In addition,
if individuals are more easily convinced through repayment to initiate the trial, it does
not lead a more risk-averse individual to a higher level of e®ort, even compared to the
standard case.
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